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ABSTRACT.  
This paper begins with Popper’s appeal to Pericles of Athens to 
illustrate the history and philosophy of a political principle of 
democracy and education that sustains the open society. It considers 
“globalism” as openness and proposes several dimenions of the 
concept of openness, before examining “Openness as Liberal 
Internationalism” and “Global Systems History”. 
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Introduction 
Karl Popper (1945) appeals to “Pericles of Athens” in the opening pages of 
The Spell of Plato, Volume I of The Open Society and Its Enemies with the 
following excerpt  
 
For the Open Society (about 430 B.C.) :    
Although only a few may originate a policy,  we are all able to 
judge it.  
 
Immediately as a contrast Popper quotes from “Plato of Athens.” 
 
Against the Open Society (about 80 years later):    
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The greatest principle of all is that nobody, whether male or 
female, should be without a leader. Nor should the mind of 
anybody be habituated to letting him do anything at all on his own 
initiative; neither out of zeal,  nor even playfully. But in war as 
well as in the midst of peace to his leader he shall direct his eye 
and follow him faithfully. And even in the smallest matter he 
should stand under leadership. For example, he should get up, or 
move, or wash, or take his meals  . . . only if he has been told to do 
so . . . In a word, he should teach his soul, by long habit, never to 
dream of acting independently, and in fact, to become utterly 
incapable of it (p. 3).  
 
Popper uses these two references to frame a critical discussion of Plato’s 
historicism. As a critical introduction to political philosophy his aim is to 
that ‘this civilization has not yet fully recovered from the shock of its birth, 
the transition from the tribal or  ‘closed society’, with its submission to 
magical forces, to the ‘open society’ which sets free the critical powers of 
man.” In the final chapter he continues in this vein: “There is no return to a 
harmonious state of nature” … “if we wish to remain human, then there is 
only one way, the way into the open society. We must  go on into the 
unknown, courageously, using what reason we  have, to plan for security and 
freedom.”   
His initial reference is to Pericles' Funeral Oration (after 490 BCE) from 
Thucydides’, The Peloponnesian War. It is a speech by Pericles that 
provides a eulogy for the principles of Athenian democracy. The statement 
of its underlying principles in fact provide a better warrant for the political 
concept of openness: 
 
It is true that we are called a democracy, for the administration in 
the hands of the many and not of the few. But while there exists 
equal justice to all and alike in their private disputes, the claim of 
excellence is also recognized; and when a citizen is in any way 
distinguished, he is preferred to the public service, not as a matter 
of privilege, but as the reward of merit. Neither is poverty an 
obstacle, but a man may benefit his country whatever the obscurity 
of his condition. There is no exclusiveness in our public life, and 
in our private business we are not suspicious of one another, nor 
angry with our neighbor if he does what he likes; we do not put on 
sour looks at him which, though harmless, are not pleasant. 
 
Our city is thrown open to the world, though and we never expel a 
foreigner and prevent him from seeing or learning anything of 
which the secret if revealed to an enemy might profit him. We rely 
not upon management or trickery, but upon our own hearts and 
hands. And in the matter of education, whereas they from early 
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youth are always undergoing laborious exercises which are to 
make them brave, we live at ease, and yet are equally ready to face 
the perils which they face.1  
 
In these brief passages Pericles points to the advantages of democracy that 
thrives on openness and transparency, despite the fact that the words 
themselves are reported by an anti-democratic Thucydides who while 
admiring Pericles’ leadership criticized the mob rule of democracy (Perry, 
2012). 
George Soros, Popper’s student, describes Popper’s concept of the open 
society as an epistemological concept rather than a political one even though 
in Popper’s hands it resembles liberal democracy and becomes a political 
instrument for societal improvement. 
Living in the twenty-first century it is necessary to revisit the notion of 
openness as it has become one of the most used concepts to analyze a welter 
of problems and situations, often with conflicting meanings. Hilary Clinton, 
as then US Secretary of State, speaking at the Open Government 
Partnership2 in Brasilia is reported as saying: 
 
In the 21st century, the US is convinced that one of the most 
significant divisions between nations will be not between east or 
west, nor over religion, so much as between open and closed 
societies. We believe those governments that hide from public 
view and dismiss ideas of openness and the aspirations of their 
people for greater freedom will find it increasingly difficult to 
create a secure society.3 
 
The history of open government has its origins in Enlightenment thought 
with philosophical attacks on state secrecy and the accompanying notion that 
government ought to be open to public scrutiny. As a doctrine it took the 
early form of constitutional commitment to freedom of the press in Sweden 
in 1766,4 followed by America and France that after the revolutions enacted 
public accountability and freedom of the press in their constitutions. Since 
the evolution of the Internet open government has taken on a new life with 
open source governance and the commitment to open politics (greater 
transparency, participation and collaboration) referred to as e-government, e-
democracy, and wiki government (Noveck, 2009) and also associated with 
movements like digital government and open government data (Nath, 2011). 
 
Globalism as Openness 
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On the basis of this discussion we can distinguish a set of meanings: 
openness as a political concept associated with a set of related concepts such 
as democracy, freedom and open government; openness as an 
epistemological concept linked to judgment, criticism and truth; openness as 
an historical concept that serves to defend liberal democracy and liberal 
modernity. In the Cold War the concept was used to defend liberalism 
against all forms of totalitarianism, and in the post-Cold War to defend 
Internet freedom against “closed societies” that prohibit the free flow of 
information and prevent social networking sites. To these easily 
distinguishable notions we can three more: economic openness that comes 
with the notion of the “open market”; openness that refers to the openness of 
interpretation (a hermeneutical concept); openness as it refers to 
technological interconnectivity; and its application and development in open 
education (see Figure 1 below).  
 
Figure 1 Meanings of the Concept of Openness 
 
1. Political – liberal democracy; freedom of speech/information, 
open government 
2. Epistemological – critical rationalism, falsification, culture of 
criticism; principles of open inquiry 
3. Historical – “Open Society” used as a historical category 
(Bergson, Popper, Soros) often to stand for liberal modernity 
4. Economic/Finance – “Open market” associated with the 
doctrine of “free trade”; refers to the relative absence of 
government regulation (Hayek, 1944) 
5. Interpretation – the “open work” as an aspect of modernism, a 
work rendered open by an author or artist to be completed by 
performer, viewer, reader or audience (Umberto Eco, 1962) 
6. Psychological – openness to experience as one domain to 
describe the human personality (McRae, 2004) 
7. Technological – open source software, open standards (free for 
use), code defined by the community of users, (vs closed or 
“proprietary”), WWW, open access, open networks 
8. Educational – open classroom, open university, OER, open 
education (Peters & Roberts, 2011) 
 
Despite these multiple strands and suggestions that under neoliberalism 
opens has been colonized by technocratic functionalism that causes a 
democratic deficit rather than overcoming it (Götz, 2014) there is a story of 
global history emerging that tends to run different meaning together as an 
overlapping and unfolding skein. It is best represented by the notion of the 
twenty-first century as the century of openness detailing the history of the 
emergence of global systems as forms of increasing interconnectivity. 
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Kishore Mahbubani, Dean of the National University of Singapore’s Lee 
Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and author of the book The Great 
Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World (2014), provides 
the story of a benign convergence with the growth of  the global middle class 
and rising standards of living for those outside the West, and the prospect of 
greater integration of China, India, Africa and the Islamic world representing 
a new global era of shared power. He profiles this kind of narrative in the 
IMF periodical Finance and Development, under the title “The Global 
Village Has Arrived” (Mahbubani, 2012):5 
 
Interconnectivity is growing by leaps and bounds 
Quietly, without much fanfare, humanity passed a significant 
milestone. Today, there are more phones than people. This does 
not mean every human being has a phone. Some have two or 
three. In 1990, only 11 million people had cell phones. In 2011, 
the number of cell phones worldwide was 5.6 billion, while the 
number of landline phones stood at 1.32 billion—as the global 
population approached 7 billion. And we can call almost any part 
of the world at almost no cost through Internet services such as 
Skype. This level of teledensity means that people have become 
interconnected at a level never seen before in history. 
 
Technology is generating global convergence. This global 
explosion of cell phones, and soon of smartphones, will take the 
Internet, and the information it conveys, to all corners of the 
globe. A small solar-powered battery and a tiny computer have 
already done this for remote African and Indian villages. This “big 
bang” of information—and education as well—is also improving 
human lives. As more people learned about vaccinations, the 
proportion of the world’s infants vaccinated against diphtheria, 
pertussis, and tetanus—via the DPT shot—climbed from one-fifth 
to nearly four-fifths between 1970 and 2006. And other ideas that 
save lives—such as washing one’s hands, or not defecating in the 
fields one eats from—have made their way around the world and 
are increasingly accepted (Kenny, 2011). Connectivity saves lives. 
 
He goes on to modify his position of technological convergence by 
suggesting that it is only one of the forces of “deep interconnectivity” citing 
a single global economy, the problem of global warming that pushes us 
toward a global ethic (Rodin, 2012), and emotional connectivity driven by 
technology as a material force.6 The thesis is defended in more detailed 
terms in his book. His defense of an optimistic picture of one global world--a 
new global civilization—revolving around the norms of a global middle 
class and the common “acceptance of the frameworks of modern science, 
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reliance on logical reasoning, embrace of free-market economics, 
transformation of the social contract between ruler and ruled, and increased 
focus on multilateralism” (p. 33) certainly suggests that states can act in 
enlightened self-interest without the resurgence of nationalism or the 
resource wars that drive international competition. His four key pillars of 
convergence — environmental, economic, technological, and aspirational—
also point to an emerging set of moral norms centered on human rights.  
Rodin (2012) argues: 
 
We are one humanity, but seven billion humans. This is the 
essential challenge of global ethics: how to accommodate the 
tension between our universal and particular natures. This tension 
is, of course, age-old and runs through all moral and political 
philosophy. But in the world of the early twenty-first century it 
plays out in distinctive new ways. Ethics has always engaged twin 
capacities inherent in every human: the capacity to harm and the 
capacity to help. But the profound set of transformations 
commonly referred to as globalization—the increasing mobility of 
goods, labor, and capital; the increasing interconnectedness of 
political, economic, and financial systems; and the radical 
empowerment of groups and individuals through technology—
have enabled us to harm and to help others in ways that our 
forebears could not have imagined. What we require from a global 
ethic is shaped by these transformative forces; and global ethics—
the success or failure of that project—will substantially shape the 
course of the twenty-first century (p. 33). 
 
Yet global ethics like the “great convergence” depends on the reform of 
global governance. Other critics like Ian Bremmers (2012) with the historic 
shift in the international system detects a leadership vacuum. On his account 
we face global uncertainty, US decline, world conflict and a new dystopia. 
Charles Kupchan (2012) also charts the decline of the West and the shift in 
power to the rising rest. In his terms the twenty-first century will be “no 
one’s world.” There will be no center of gravity and multiple modernities. 
The challenge is to manage the global turn by design. World order or the 
coming anarchy? Henry Kissinger’s (2014) latest book World Order 
provides a recent introduction to the meaning of the concept of “world 
order” and its various models and interpretations. It also raises the question 
of the relativity of “world order” to a religious or cultural framing. Will Pax 
Americana endure? Does it have the capacity to recognise that “liberal 
internationalism” may be failing? 
 
Globalism and World Order: Openness as Liberal Internationalism 
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The liberal internationalism promoted by Lord Palmerston as British Foreign 
Secretary in the early twentieth century and President Woodrow Wilson was 
designed to promote a form of intervention based on liberal principles. It was 
the means to encourage the architecture of global structures that were 
supposed to enhance the spread of liberal internationalist democratic politics: 
a liberal economic order including the free market together with the doctrine 
of global free trade, the Rule of Law with limited government at home, state 
sovereignty and self-determination. This internationalist order was also 
credited with the encouragement of human rights and a form of 
internationalism that could be built by multilateral organizations after WWII 
like the United Nations aimed at eliminating the worst excesses of power 
politics. Kissinger is sanguine. Kissinger’s book is described as the 
summation of his “thinking about history, strategy and statecraft" and is 
surprising in the message that the concept of world order cannot be simply 
made in the West’s own image and yet little argument to cope with radically 
different pluralism at the level of concepts of world order. We might say that 
Kissinger raises and defines the problem—perhaps the problem of global 
survival—although he does not provide the basis for its resolution. By 
contrast Robert Kaplan (2001) The Coming Anarchy documents how 
scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease are rapidly destroying 
the social fabric of our planet and ranking alongside Huntington’s (1996) 
Clash of Civilizations and Fukuyama’s (1992) The End of History and the 
Last Man.  
Nathaniel Tkacz (2012) examines the increased use and visibility of the 
term openness as a political concept—a sort of Openness 2.0, after the 
discourse initiated by Bergson, Popper and Hayek—tracing its re-emergence 
in the software and network cultures of the 1980s and following decades. He 
asks the question: “How is that new movements championing openness have 
emerged within a supposedly already-open society?” (p. 386). He begins his 
critique of open politics and the shift from open source to open government 
with two useful orienting quotations. The first from Lawrence Lessig (2005: 
260) suggests that it is wrong to think of “issues of free software, or open 
source software, as if they were simply questions about the efficiency of 
coding.” He continues: “I think the issues of open source and free software 
are fundamental in a free society. I think they are at the core of what we 
mean by an open society.” The second quotation comes from Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri (2004: 340) who write: 
 
One approach to understanding the democracy of the multitude, 
then, is as an open-source society, that is, a society whose source 
code is revealed so that we all can work collaboratively to solve its 
bugs and create new, better social programs.  
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Tkacz (2012) provides a useful account of the shift from systems to open 
source thinking--although not a social view of the mathematics evolution 
from cybernetics, to chaos and complexity theory—to the point of where 
open takes flight with software like GNU/Linuxbased operating system. He 
explores the translation of this kind of second-generation openness into a 
proliferating political ideal taken up in conceptions that treat openness as a 
platform for government. His critique is a critique of Popper’s original 
conception that is good on identifying “enemies” but thin on giving “open” 
any positive content beyond a simply equation with democracy. The mistake 
in my view is to identify “open” as a naïve and non-contestable political 
concept and not to recognise it different meanings and appropriation (Peter 
& Roberts, 2011). The huge difference between Popper’s formulation of 
“open” in the open society is that is embraces and is committed to the 
assumption of individualism not only of democracy but as a working 
assumption underlying his critique of historicism and all forms of 
collectivism. What differentiates Popper from Lessig and Hardt and Negri is 
precisely the way in which “Openness 2.0” depends on new social forms of 
knowledge (social media, social production, social innovation, social 
democracy) that utilised collective intelligence and collective action. 
Much of the literature of openness in its first incantation is directed at the 
West as a defence of liberal modernity as the global template that the world 
might follow. Histories of globalization often tend to mention increasingly 
interdependence and interconnectivity as principal characteristics especially 
in the post-Cold War process of world economic integration. Some in 
addition reject explanations of globalization as a linear process but rarely do 
they go beyond a recognition of complexity to understand the problems of 
managing a complex multilateralism in a multi-tiered system with the 
development of the informal G-20 system, the rise of non-state actors, a new 
regionalism as well as an emerging international civil society based on a 
rapidly growing network of NGOs. 
 
Global Systems History  
 
World systems theory is an approach to world history examining the waves 
of world integration from the perspective of a transnational division of 
labour between core and periphery countries. It originated in the work of the 
Annales school characterized by Fernard Braudel who focused on long-term 
processes operated on the basis of geo-ecological units of analysis. World-
systems theory represented by Immanuel Wallerstein drew on neo-Marxist 
dependency theory stringly associated with Andrew Gunder Frank to analyse 
the world development process. Wallerstein suggests that the contemporary 
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world-system originated in the sixteenth century with the “discovery” of the 
Americas. Much of the research is tied to analyses of the rise and impact of 
capitalism, the history of global labor movements and theories of temporality 
rather than focusing on the dynamic, nonlinear, transformational nature of 
current informational big data systems that change the nature of history in 
ever greater complexity. This is perhaps the difference with what Alan 
Woods calls “global systems history.” 
Alan Wood (2010) suggests: 
 
The old atomistic, mechanistic, and analytic worldview, which 
portrayed the world in strictly nominalist terms as consisting of 
parts with few or no intrinsic connections to each other, and which 
dominated modern life since the Scientific Revolution, is no 
longer adequate. Now the problems are systemic, interdependent, 
interdisciplinary, and interconnected (p. 289). 
 
He imagines a new “global systems history”—“a universal, ecological, and 
systems perspective” (p. 289) that draws inspiration from Asian holistic 
traditions and modern scientific complex systems theory that focuses on 
“complementarity rather than separateness.” He mentions five characteristics 
of systems theory, well researched in the literature that he applies to global 
history: emergence, feedback, interconnectivity, self-organization, and 
cooperation. Andrea Jones-Rooy and Scott E Page (2010) point out that not 
all systems produce complexity or outcomes that are “good”—they can also 
produce large events like wars, financial crises and epidemics. 
Interconnectivity and interdependence are relational characteristics that 
speak to the growing links between networks perhaps best exemplified by 
the World Wide Web. But increased global interconnectivity does not 
necessarily imply spatio-temporal convergence or geo-temporal uniformity, 
nor should it be taken as an implicit endorsement for the view that world 
convergence is a result of the effects of Western colonialism, now 
represented by US hegemony at  the centre of financialization and the world 
debt economy. Eisenstadt’s (2000, 2002) “mulitple modernities” argued for 
the precedence of the cultural and the local over the global to highlight 
differences in local traditions and their resistances to Western 
modernization. Yet the interconnectivity of ideas, information, and 
increasingly images gives rise to a highly compressed sense of world 
temporality driving us toward “the epoch of digital reason” (Peters, 2014). 
Even though some civilizational societies have the power to 
reconceptualise their own cultural interpretations of modernity—of change 
and development—rejecting the West model of development, increasingly 
they are caught up in the modern transmutation of information, 
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communication, knowledge, science and technology whether or not this 
leads to convergence or polychronicities. The hypothesis of openness is not 
determining of any outcome because it relinquishes that old linear cause and 
effect for a kind of transformation logic in which systems can rapidly change 
and transform their properties. This might be referred to as the deep 
grammar of world development that is a form of complexity and in principle 
as difficult to predict as an emerging weather system. 
The complexity turn of the 1990s arose out of system thinking in the 
1950s including the Macy Conferences on cybernetics that questioned the 
mechanised Newtonian epistemologies and linear causation of closed 
systems to prioritise process of structure and to theorise local determinism, 
flows, transformational and emergent systems and dynamic non-linear 
causation. Second and third generation cybernetics figured as a code word 
for global communications and media studies. As an epistemology related to 
systemics and systems philosophy the term as functioned as an approach for 
investigating a wide range of phenomena in information and communication 
theory, computer science and computer-based design environments, artificial 
intelligence, management, human systems and consciousness studies, 
cognitive engineering and knowledge-based systems, emergence and self-
regulation, ecosystems, sustainable development, hypermedia and hypertext, 
and Web science. Innovations came with Simon’s (1962) discussion of 
complexity, Miller’s (1978) work on living systems, Maturana and Varela’s 
(1980). work on autopoiesis, i.e. self-production, Mandelbrot's (1977) work 
on fractal forms, Zadeh (1965) work fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic, Thom’s 
(1975) work on the theory of catastrophes, and the development of chaos 
theory. Recent contributions include the Hungarian Csanyi's (1989) work on 
the ‘replicative model of self-organization’, Langton (1989) on AL, Sabeili’s 
(1991) theory of processes, and McNeil (1993) on the possibility of a better 
synthesis between physical sciences and living system’s work on the theory 
of catastrophes, and the development of chaos theory (François, 1999). 
The globalization of system analyses within and across the disciplines 
demands a complexity approach, but more importantly, it demonstrates that 
these complex systems can operate simultaneously at different levels—the 
level of infrastructure, code and content, for instance within communication 
systems, to enable certain freedoms while controlling others. Complexity as 
an approach to knowledge and knowledge systems now recognizes both the 
develops of global systems architectures in (tele)communications and 
information with the development of open knowledge production systems 
that increasingly rest not only on the establishment of new and better 
platforms (sometimes called Web 2.0), the semantic web, new search 
algorithms and processes of digitization but also social processes and 
policies that foster openness as an overriding value as evidenced in the 
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growth of open source, open access and open education and their 
convergences that characterize global knowledge communities that transcend 
borders of the nation-state. 
What is missing here is a conception of openness as a complex skein that 
is powered by the cultural invention of a kind of mathematics, beginning 
with Boolean algebra and the evolution of electronics, like the invention of 
writing before it in human history, that has propelled human beings into new 
and greater forms of interconnectivity emulating and sharing various features 
of the natural world and now blurring the boundaries between the natural 
and the cultural. Part of the conceptual difficulty lies in accounts that are 
crude versions of technological determinism rather than a body of theory 
driven by an understanding that views the modern history of the computer, 
communication, and cognition in terms of the mathematics of complexity. 
This is a history that embraces a social account of these overlapping 
developments based on the observation concerning the social character of 
knowledge (and language), and a set of philosophical views of Pierce, 
Dewey and Wittgenstein that look to socialized accounts of logic, truth and 
language including their operationalization in electronics. A philosophical 
theory of technology can recognise its social roots and relations as well as 
posing critical questions concerning its distribution, ownership and access. 
Hannu Nieminen (2014) provides “A Short History of the Epistemic 
Commons” emphasizing that the quest for openness (and public exchange) is 
seen as “a continuation of the long historical development of the epistemic 
commons, which began in the Middle Ages and culminated in the legacy of 
the Enlightenment” (p. 55). He suggests that “European modernity is 
fundamentally based on the assumption that knowledge and culture belong 
to the common domain and that the process of democratisation necessarily 
means removing restrictions on the epistemic commons.” Yet he remarks 
that neoliberalism has systematically weakened the expansion of the 
commons by privatising public institutions and CEE countries did not 
experience the same democratic development after WWII because there was 
no tradition of democratic public institutions. 
The complexity analysis of globalisation can demonstrate at the same 
time convergence and heterogeneity, difference and monoculturalism, digital 
logics that encourage dispersal and decentralization on the one hand, and 
also regrouping, concentration and a core/periphery relationship, on the 
other. The notion of globalization as a form of self-generating capital 
seemed to point to the freedom of the transnational  corporation during the 
1990s and 2000s wedded to the process of ‘financialization of capitalism’ 
that seems to have accompanied neoliberalism and globalization, 
representing a shift from production to financial services, proliferation of 
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monopolistic multinational corporations and the financialization of the 
capital accumulation process. 
In the second decade of the twenty-first century globalization has become 
more characterized by a geo-economics where economic warfare 
undermines economic integration and regional multilateral trading regimes 
take precedence of global ones (Leonard, 2015). Economic sanctions and 
restrictions, the geopoliticization of trade, forms of state capitalism and 
politicized central banks where debt and credit are weaponized, increasingly 
shift the world toward gated markets, regional institutions, and subglobal 
politics.  
While global systems history depicts the underlying digital logics that 
increasingly structure overlapping big systems and integrate world trade and 
finance there is a disconnect and uncoupling from the world that involves 
movements of people who migrate often as a consequence of bad or failing 
markets, falling prices, war and conflict (Peters & Besley, 2015a & b). 
Economic migrants from poor regions to the rich Atlantic states can be 
understood partly in these terms. More troubling cases involve the forced 
migration of those seeking asylum from war zones such as the massive 
migration of Syrian refugees who have left Syria and refugee camps in 
neighboring states to travel through Greece and Macedonia to reach safe 
haven in Germany and the Nordic states. In this case the historic scale of 
migration imperils the refugees in collection border points like Lebos and 
Calais and forces a contradiction of liberal internationalism which poses a 
paradox for the liberal state and the EU where some member states like 
Hungary and Austria seem no longer committed to principles of asylum that 
are fundamental to both the identity and constitution of the new Europe. 




1. The translation is by Benjamin Jowett (1881) and is an excerpt from Reading 
About the World, Volume 1, edited by Paul Brians, Mary Gallwey, Douglas Hughes, 
Azfar Hussain, Richard Law, Michael Myers Michael Neville, Roger Schlesinger, 




2. See http://www.opengovpartnership.org/: “OGP was launched in 2011 to 
provide an international platform for domestic reformers committed to making their 
governments more open, accountable, and responsive to citizens.” 
3. See http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/apr/17/open-closed-
society-hillary-clinton. See also Clinton’s “Remarks on Internet Freedom” at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.  
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4. See the webpage “Openness Shapes Swedish Society” 
https://sweden.se/society/openness-shapes-swedish-society/. In operation see 
http://www.opengov.se/govtrack/.  For the notion of “Nordic openness” see Norbert 
Götz and Carl Marklund (2014) The Paradox of Openness: Transparency and 
Participation in Nordic Cultures, and Götz “The Concept of Openness: promise and 
Paradox” (Chapter 1). Freedom of information (FOI), an extension of freedom os 
speech, is regarded as a fundamental human right including freedom of expression 
often conceptually linked to democracy. In the modern context the US was one of 
the first to embrace FOI in law (1966) and since then nearly half the world countries 
have enacted similar legislation. The movement has taken on related digital forms as 
such open government data and digital government. 
5. See http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/09/mahbuban.htm#author  
6. The crude version of technological convergence is also the driving conception 
at the World Economuc Forum: “Hyperconnectivity is the increasing digital 
interconnection of people – and things – anytime and anywhere. By 2020 there will 
be 50 billion networked devices. This level of connectivity will have profound 
social, political and economic consequences, and increasingly form part of our 
everyday lives, from the cars we drive and medicines we take, to the jobs we do and 
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